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ER 6-8372

4 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Organizational Proposal for the Production of Intelligence on International Communism

REFERENCE: Draft Memorandum, dated 9 November 1954,  
"Production of Intelligence on International Communism"

1. There appears to be general agreement that the output of finished intelligence on communism needs to be substantially increased. This need has been recognized and voiced from time to time for several years and restated recently in the USIA survey, an OCB paper concerning propaganda against communism, and other internally circulated CIA papers. In order that steps might be taken to provide for the desired increased output, the SA/PC/DCI was directed to examine the appropriate location of primary responsibility for the production of intelligence on international communism and to consult with the Special Assistant/Intelligence, Department of State, on this subject. After preliminary consideration of the referenced memorandum, the SA/PC/DCI was directed to develop specific recommendations concerning any desirable expansion of functions and new organizational arrangements within the CIA that might be required to meet the recognized need. This memorandum sets forth a recommended course of action in response to both of these requests.

2. The more important conclusions set forth in the referenced memorandum, and apparently generally accepted within the CIA, were that there are three distinguishable intelligence production activities all of which need to be initiated or expanded. They are:

a. The production of finished intelligence of a level of generality useful to policymakers, organized for the most part in the form of

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studies of institutions, situations, and developments in particular countries, including most contributions to NIEs and the NIS and much current intelligence;

b. The provision of operational intelligence in support of FI and CE activities and of specific and detailed information on communist organizations, communication nets and personalities, including much unclassified specific detail useable for propaganda and other PP purposes at home and abroad;

c. Continuing basic and operational research on, and speculative study of, communism and the means of countering communism.

**CONCLUSIONS:**

3. That the production of intelligence outlined in paragraph 2a should continue to be the responsibility of the Department of State inasmuch as there is no practical way to divide the subject matter of political and social intelligence as a whole, which is the responsibility of State, into two distinguishable subjects one of which is "Communism" and the other "everything else."

4. That the production of intelligence outlined in paragraph 2b above should be assigned to DDP.

5. That the activity outlined in paragraph 2c above (which is in part intelligence, in part estimation, and in part speculation on policy) should be carried on initially by two or three senior officers pending the possible evolution of a Senior Research and Planning Staff along the more formal lines outlined in the reference paper. These officers should be attached for administrative purposes to the DDI with the assurance of close collaboration with the DDP/CI staff and particularly the International Communism Branch.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

6. To implement the foregoing conclusions it is recommended:

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b. That the [REDACTED] in DDP/CI be enlarged either through the addition of personnel doing similar work obtained from other parts of DDP or/and the addition of new T.O. to carry out the second production activity, namely, the operational intelligence support. This staff should, of course, have access to operational material in the DDP area but should also make maximum use of intelligence produced in the Department of State and in the offices of the DDI as well as of overt intelligence. The expanded [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] should recognize clearly that its function is not only to provide intelligence support for the Clandestine Services but also to meet the needs of other components of the community for specific and detailed intelligence. In particular it should make every effort to sanitize its product to meet the needs of agencies such as the USIA and the Defense Department. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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c. That in lieu of formally establishing at this time a senior research and planning unit as proposed in the paper of November 9, two or three senior officers be assigned to devote themselves to the kind of work described in 2c above. They should be administratively assigned to the DDI, encouraged to develop mutually stimulating relations with the DDP/CI, and particularly the [REDACTED] with access to such operational information as would be relevant to their task. These research and planning officers should not have administrative responsibilities or the management of research programs. They should have the objectivity expected of intelligence officers and, while they should be accessible to operational personnel for consultation on operational problems, they should not become involved in operational responsibilities. They should have overt status in order to permit easy consultation with policy officers in other departments, with scholars and academic institutions, and with individuals and institutions of other countries. This proposal reflects the view that the development of a senior research and planning staff as proposed in the November 9 paper must be evolutionary since its acceptability and influence will depend upon the quality and performance of the individuals in it.

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d. That the senior research and planning officers proposed in (c) preceding be selected by the top officers of the Agency on the basis of individual merit from any part of the Agency or from outside and that they be assigned administratively to the DDI but that they have free access to senior officers in all parts of the Agency. The assignment of officers to this function will in itself have the effect of encouraging promising individuals with a background in this field to devote themselves over a long period of time to study and speculation on international communism.

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[REDACTED]

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Special Assistant to the Director  
for Planning and Coordination

**CONCURRENCES:**

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[REDACTED]

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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Concur subject to the deletion of  
the word "operational" in line 7  
of paragraph 6 (c).

[REDACTED]

Deputy Director (Plans)

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\* [REDACTED]

\* Deputy Director (Support)

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[REDACTED]

15 Aug

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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18 AUG 1955

Director of Central Intelligence

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But do not wish assume containing  
Commitment to pay [REDACTED] year  
to State [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]  
their own appreciation [REDACTED]

The CI Staff 25X1A  
has vacancies now, but additional  
personnel will have to be authorized  
eventually. [REDACTED]

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K. White

DD/S

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